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Abstract: There are three main ways in which
Christian theology enriches a broader scientific
narrative. First, it provides us with a reassurance of
the coherence of reality; second, it offers answers
to the scientifically unanswerable ultimate
questions; and third, it is able to enrich a scientific
narrative by preventing it from collapsing into a
technocratic catalogue of common things. In this
regard, the paper explores some aspects of the
relevance of theology for the understanding of
the world, as a means of opening up a discussion
of how could be developed an inclusive scientific
theory.
Keywords: Science, Faith, Reason.
Resumen: La teología tiene tres formas de enri-
quecer un discurso científico más amplio. En pri-
mer lugar, asegura la coherencia de la realidad; en
segundo lugar, ofrece respuestas a las cuestiones
últimas que la ciencia no puede responder; y, en
tercer lugar, enriquece el discurso científico impi-
diendo que se convierta en una tecnocracia, un ca-
tálogo de cosas sin importancia. A este propósito,
en este artículo se exploran algunos aspectos sobre
la importancia de la teología para la comprensión
del mundo, como un primer paso para abrir un de-
bate sobre cómo se ha de desarrollar una teoría
científica inclusiva.
Palabras clave: Ciencia, Fe, Razón.
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T his paper will consider some aspects of the relevance of theology forour understanding of ourselves and our world, and how we might en-gage, represent, and inhabit this world. I want to explore what we
might call an «inclusive scientific theory», using the term «science» in its clas-
sic – as opposed to Anglophone – sense of an intellectual discipline, distin-
guished by its own distinct vocabulary, conceptuality, and methodology. A
science is a disciplined way of thinking, which thus includes – but is not limi-
ted to – the natural sciences.
The fundamental question I wish to consider is whether we need to think
in terms of our knowledge as a disconnected series of domains, each of which
might be known individually, yet which cannot be woven together or integra-
ted to disclose a «big picture», an integrated theory of reality. Can we, as
many believe and hope to be true, discover a grander vision of our universe,
which holds together a coherent view of our world, and which allows each
science to contribute to unfolding and enriching this vision? Can we weave
the threads of multiple sciences together, and create a tapestry of meaning?
Many Spanish-speaking writers have explored this question, and I take plea-
sure in noting and honouring their approaches 1.
There is something about human nature that makes us want to try and
find such an integral picture of the universe. I could easily point to a rich va-
riety of recent empirical psychological studies which make this point 2. I hesi-
tate to attempt a distillation of the large body of research literature on this to-
pic, but it seems that we cope better with our complex and messy world if we
feel that we can discern meaning and value within our own lives, and in the
greater order of things around us. However, I would like to honour the Spa-
nish intellectual tradition by citing from one of its most interesting twentieth-
century representatives – the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955).
Listen to what he has to say on this point. After considering the limits placed
on the role of the natural sciences, Ortega makes this remark 3:
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1 See especially ILLANES, J. L., «Teología y ciencias en una visión cristiana de la universidad»,
Scripta Theologica 14 (1982) 873-888; FLORIO, L., «Las ciencias naturales en la elaboración de la
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n. 1-4; quotes at 259.
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De aquí que sea al hombre materialmente imposible, por una for-
zosidad psicológica, renunciar a poseer una noción completa del mundo,
una idea integral del Universo.
In making this assertion, Ortega is highlighting the human interest in ex-
ploring two fundamental questions, which are often pursued in isolation of one
another: the question of how the universe functions, and the question of what the
universe means.
La verdad científica se caracteriza por su exactitud y el rigor de sus
previsiones. Pero estas admirables calidades son conquistadas por la cien-
cia experimental a cambio de mantenerse en un plano de problemas se-
cundarios, dejando intactas las últimas, las decisivas cuestiones.
Ortega argues that we need a «big picture», an «integral idea of the uni-
verse» which possesses existential depth, and not merely cognitive functiona-
lity. The natural sciences, he argues, have a wonderful capacity to explain how
human beings function, while nevertheless failing to satisfy deeper human
longings and aspirations. We find a similar view in the writings of Sir Peter
Medawar, a British biologist and Nobel Laureate who championed the public
engagement of science 4:
Only humans find their way by a light that illuminates more than
the patch of ground they stand on.
Human beings seem to possess some desire to reach beyond the mecha-
nics of engagement with our world, looking for deeper patterns of significan-
ce and meaning.
Perhaps I could tell you something of my own story to illuminate this
point. My own rediscovery of the enriched understanding and appreciation of
the world made possible through Christian theology took place at Oxford
University. It was a somewhat cerebral and intellectual conversion, focussing
on my growing realization that belief in God made a lot more sense of things
than my atheism. I had no emotional need for any idea of God, being perfectly
prepared to embrace nihilism – if this was right. Yet I mistakenly assumed that
the existential bleakness of atheism was an indication of its truth. What if
truth were to turn out to be attractive?
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Having already discovered the beauty and wonder of nature, I realized
that I had – as the poet T. S. Eliot put it – «had the experience but missed
the meaning». I gradually came to the view so winsomely expressed by C. S.
Lewis 5:
I believe in Christianity as I believe that the Sun has risen, not only
because I see it, but because by it, I see everything else.
It was as if an intellectual sun had risen and illuminated the scientific
landscape before my eyes, allowing me to see details and interconnections that
I would otherwise have missed altogether. I had once been drawn to atheism
on account of the minimalism of its intellectual demands; I now found myself
discovering the richness of the intellectual outcomes of Christianity.
I did not think of myself as being «religious» in any way, and my new
faith did not result in any habits of «religiosity». As far as I was concerned, I
had simply discovered a new theoria – a way of seeing things which originated
in wonder, and ended in a deeper understanding and appreciation of reality.
To use Salman Rushdie’s terms, I discovered that «the idea of God» is both «a
repository for our awestruck wonderment at life and an answer to the great
questions of existence» 6.
It will be clear that my conversion – if that is the right word – was lar-
gely intellectual. I had discovered a new way of seeing reality, and was deligh-
ted by what I found. Like Dorothy L. Sayers (1893-1957), I was convinced
that Christianity seemed to offer an account of reality that was «intellectually
satisfactory» 7. Yet, also like Sayers, I found my initial delight in the internal
logic of the Christian faith to be so compelling that I occasionally wondered
if I had merely «fallen in love with an intellectual pattern» 8. Yet the distincti-
ve Trinitarian logic of the Christian faith both encourages and opens up an en-
gagement with other sciences, the pursuit of which has taken up much of my
time over the last forty years. In this paper, I would like to offer some modest
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5 LEWIS, C. S., Essay Collection, London: HarperCollins, 2002, 21. For further reflection, see
MCGRATH, A. E., «The Privileging of Vision: Lewis’s Metaphors of Light, Sun, and Sight», in
The Intellectual World of C. S. Lewis, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 83-104.
6 RUSHDIE, S., Is Nothing Sacred? The Herbert Read Memorial Lecture 1990, Cambridge: Granta,
1990, 8.
7 Letter to DUFF, L. T., 10 May 1943, The Letters of Dorothy L. Sayers: Volume II, 1937 to 1943, edi-
ted by REYNOLDS, B., New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996, 401.
8 Letter to TEMPLE, W., Archbishop of Canterbury, 7 September 1943, The Letters of Dorothy L.
Sayers: Volume II, 1937 to 1943, 429.
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reflections on the possibilities of intellectual dialogue and coordination that
the Christian vision of reality enables.
In the last twenty years, a growing consensus has emerged that concepts
of human rationality are domain-specific, in that that each intellectual disci-
pline develops a set of intellectual virtues, procedures and criteria which are
deemed to be appropriate to its distinct tasks and procedures 9. So how do the-
se rationalities relate to each other? Is there some «meta-rationality» which
they each reflect or embody, in their own distinct manners? Or are they to be
seen as essentially independent, perhaps bearing some family resemblance
allowing the door to be kept open for at least the possibility of shared norms or
methods across disciplines? And what form might such a meta-rationality
take? Are we speaking of a standpoint of logical necessity, based, like Euclid’s
geometry, on axiomatic deduction? Or of a plausible cohesiveness, holding to-
gether a domain of particulars after the manner of James Joyce’s Ulysses? Or
an imagined – though not for that reason imaginary – grand picture of reality,
which provides a means of visualizing interconnectedness, without offering an
algorithmic calibration of those links?
For me, Christian theology offers us a way of imagining our world,
which is grounded in the New Testament. It allows us to imagine – that is, to
see – the world afresh, rejecting limiting categorizations and over-intellectua-
lized accounts of reality which ultimately impoverish our understanding of the
world and ourselves. If we think of a social imaginary as a «world-forming and
meaning-bestowing creative force» 10, we can conceive of the Church as a «so-
cial imaginary», a community which is, in the first place shaped by this ima-
ginative vision, and in the second, which offers this imaginative lens to the
world, in order that it may see itself as it really is.
Augustine sees the Christian community as playing a critical role in this
process by reinforcing this way of seeing things by its proclamation and sa-
cramental ministries, which both narrate and enact this vision of reality, co-
rrelating it with human experience. Tota igitur opera nostra, fratres, in hac vita
est, sanare oculum cordis, unde videatur Deus 11. Augustine’s telling phrase «hea-
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10 GAONKAR, D., «Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduction», Public Culture 14 (2002) 1-19, n. 1;
quote at 6.
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ling the eyes of the heart» (cfr. Ephesians 1:18) suggests that the acquisition
of such new habits of thought can be compared to a blind person being ena-
bled to see the world for the first time. The Christian way of «seeing» reality
is neither naturally acquired nor naturally endorsed. It comes about through
the Christian revelation, which brings about a transformation of our percep-
tion of things. And that revelation is mediated through the proclamation of
the Christian church – including its preaching and sacraments.
This «imaginary» is not to be reduced to a Kantian conceptual net, but
rather to an active empowering capacity to see things in a fresh and compe-
lling manner. If we had more time, I might pause here to engage with Corne-
lius Castoriadis’s argument that the «imaginary» is constitutive of meaning, in
that it provides an eidos, a means of seeing and structuring reality, which allows
us to conceive of – or re-imagine – the real in the first place 12. Or with Char-
les Taylor’s generative account of social imaginaries, and the role that the ima-
gination plays in a community’s construction of reality 13.
In this paper, I shall briefly map two approaches to conceptualizing the
rational relationship between the natural sciences and Christian theology, as a
means of opening up a discussion of how we might begin to develop and un-
fold an inclusive scientific theory, no matter how provisional and tentative this
might be. Both these approaches are essentially heuristic, offering an imagi-
native framework which helps us to see how their intellectual territories might
overlap and interact, without providing a rigorous means of adjudicating te-
rritorial boundary disputes or determining levels of porosity.
The idea that there are multiple ways of viewing or approaching a com-
plex reality can be traced back to Plato. Reality is too vast to be fully appre-
hended by any single individual; we can at best hope to grasp part of that
greater whole, and allow others to supplement our limited apprehension.
Knowledge is thus a communitarian or corporate undertaking, involving the
aggregation and assimilation of multiple perceptions. C. S. Lewis is perhaps
one of the best-known representatives of this view, arguing that literature re-
presents an accumulation of insights, open to personal appropriation and
synthesis 14.
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Sozialtheorie von Cornelius Castoriadis, Göttingen: Wallstein, 2012.
13 TAYLOR, Ch., Modern Social Imaginaries, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004.
14 LEWIS, C. S., An Experiment in Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961, 140-141.
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My own eyes are not enough for me, I will see through those of
others... In reading great literature, I become a thousand men and yet re-
main myself. Like the night sky in the Greek poem, I see with a myriad
eyes, but it is still I who see.
Literature, for Lewis, enables us «to see with other eyes, to imagine with
other imaginations, to feel with other hearts, as well as our own» 15. The wea-
ving together of such multiple perspectives and partial insights is left to the
creative imagination of the individual knower. In this way, Lewis suggests, it
is possible to «heal the wound, without undermining the privilege, of indivi-
duality». The imaginative scope of the individual thinker is enhanced by the
perspectives and insights of others; yet that thinker’s distinct identity and in-
dividuality is affirmed and respected.
Nietzsche developed a related approach in his Will to Power, arguing that
the human eye cannot take in the rich landscape with which it is confronted,
and tends to focus on features in the immediate foreground of the field of vi-
sion. This complexity of the visual field leads to the perception that there is
no single meaning (Sinn) to be discerned as lying behind the world; rather,
there are countless meanings 16. Although the implications of Nietzsche’s pers-
pectivism are the subject of considerable debate, it seems that the decision to
accept one such meaning as normative is best seen as an act of intellectual self-
determination rather than of discernment. Truth not something that is «the-
re», waiting to be «found or discovered», but is rather «something that must
be created», and that thus refer to a process, or a «will to overcome that has in
itself no end». Nietzsche himself does not develop an intellectual project de-
signed to integrate multiple perspectives, being more concerned with explo-
ring the implications of the human tendency to identify what is seen to be re-
levant for pragmatic reasons.
Defenders of certain forms of scientific perspectivalism argue that the
approach is able to describe not merely different regions of the same complex
system but the same system at different levels 17. Perspectives are to be seen as
a visual metaphor, an imaginatively rich yet cognitively inexact manner of des-
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
17 See the important analysis in RUEGER, A., «Perspectival Models and Theory Unification», Bri-
tish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2005) 579-594, especially 590-592.
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cribing the many features of a complex system, without necessarily resolving
the complexities of their relationships. The appeal to multiple perspectives is
a strategy for saving the phenomena, providing a conceptual net that captures
complexity and detail, yet without resolving the relationship of the various
elements of the picture. No perspective offers a «perfect model» of reality; ra-
ther, each perspective offers an account of reality which is not that of exact iso-
morphism, but rather that of similarity, and then always in limited respects and
degrees. The challenge is that of the coordination – perhaps even unification
– of such perspectives without losing their local explanatory power.
Yet the visual metaphor of «perspective» offers more than the recogni-
tion of multiple ways of viewing and representing a complex reality; it also ca-
talyses discussion about different levels of reality, by offering a means of vi-
sualizing the depth of a complex entity. The origins of linear perspective at the
time of the Renaissance arose from an artistic desire to be able to convey
depth in drawings, thus enabling two-dimensional representation of a three-
dimensional reality 18. Yet there are concerns that need to be raised about such
an approach, including the anxiety that the use of perspective introduces a
homogeneity or orderedness which is alien to the direct experience of reality
itself, thus imposing a predetermined structure on what is being observed 19.
The natural sciences make extensive use of the notion of «levels of ex-
planation», an approach which counters inappropriate reductionist tendencies
by emphasising that some explanations might be offered of certain aspects of
systems which could not be applied to every aspect of a system, or the system
as a whole 20. Reality is stratified, and each scientific discipline develops re-
search methods adapted to its specific objects of study. The form of «critical
realism» developed by the British philosopher and social scientist Roy Bhas-
kar provides a conceptual tool that affirms the ontological unity of reality,
while recognizing that this unity expresses itself at different levels, each de-
manding a form of engagement which is determined by the distinctive iden-
tity of the area of reality under investigation 21. Bhaskar’s account of critical
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18 For the suggestion that there are theological roots to this approach, see EDGERTON, S. Y., The
Mirror, the Window and the Telescope: How Renaissance Linear Perspective Changed Our Vision of the
Universe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, 36.
19 See especially PANOFSKY, E., «Die Perspektive als “Symbolische Form”», in Aufsätze zu Grund-
fragen der Kunstwissenschaft, Berlin: Volker Spiess, 1980, 99-167.
20 POTOCHNIK, A., «Levels of Explanation Reconceived», Philosophy of Science 77 (2010) 59-72, n. 1.
21 For a useful overview, see COLLIER, A., Critical Realism: An Introduction to Roy Bhaskar’s Philo-
sophy, London: Verso, 1994.
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realism – which he earlier described as «Transcendental Realism» or «Criti-
cal Naturalism» – allows the active exploration of social realities, thus opening
up a rich conceptual toolbox for engaging the multiple levels of religious be-
lief, practice, and communities.
This form of critical realism insists that the world must be regarded as
differentiated and stratified. Each individual science deals with a different
stratum of this reality, which in turn obliges it to develop and use methods of
investigation adapted and appropriate to this stratum. Stratum B might be
grounded in, and emerge from, Stratum A. Yet despite this relation of origin,
the same methods of investigation cannot be used in dealing with these two
different strata. These methods must be established a posteriori, through an
engagement with each of these strata of reality. Each level is to be regarded as
distinct, thus demanding its own method of investigation and representation
which is adapted to its structures and forms, rather than having some metho-
dology developed for another purpose and application to be imposed upon it.
Bhaskar thus offers an account of the relation of the natural and social
sciences which affirms their methodological commonalities, while respecting
their distinctions, particularly when these arise on account of their objects of
investigation 22.
Naturalism holds that it is possible to give an account of science un-
der which the proper and more or less specific methods of both the na-
tural and social sciences can fall. But it does not deny that there are sig-
nificant differences in these methods, grounded in real differences in
their subject-matters and in the relationships in which these sciences
stand to them... It is the nature of the object that determines the form of
its possible science.
We see here a clear recognition of each science being characterized by
the nature of its object, and being obligated to respond to that object in a
manner which is appropriate to its distinctive nature: ontology determines
epistemology. If we have «a conception of the world as stratified and diffe-
rentiated», the nature of any specific object determines both the manner in
which it can be known, and the extent to which it can be known. There is thus
no mathesis universalis, no single and universal methodology for investigating
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everything, such as that proposed during the Enlightenment, and echoed by
later writers such as the German philosopher Heinrich Scholz 23.
There is an obvious theological counterpart here. The Scottish theolo-
gian Thomas F. Torrance (1913-2007) argued that all intellectual disciplines
or sciences are under an intrinsic obligation to give an account of reality «ac-
cording to its distinct nature» 24. For Torrance, this means that both scientists
and theologians are under an obligation to «think only in accordance with the
nature of the given». The object which is to be investigated must be allowed
a voice in this process of inquiry. The distinctive characteristic of a «science»
is to give an accurate and objective account of things in a manner that is ap-
propriate to the reality being investigated. Both theology and the natural
sciences are thus to be seen as a posteriori activities which respond to «the gi-
ven» rather than as a priori speculation based on philosophical first principles.
In the case of the natural sciences, this «given» is the world of nature; in the
case of theological science, it is God’s self-revelation in Christ.
It is important to appreciate that the recognition of stratification does
not imply, still less entail, that the properties of higher strata are determined
by, or can be predicted on the basis of, the lower strata. It is a commonplace
in popular scientific writings to offer arbitrary reductionist accounts of com-
plex phenomena, such as Francis Crick’s simplistic overstatement 25:
You, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions,
your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the
behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.
This represents a reductive explanation of human behaviour which arbi-
trarily terminates at the molecular level, apparently on the basis of the unsta-
ted assumption that the properties and status of lower (though in this case not
the lowest) levels determine those of the higher. Biological processes are as-
sumed to always be derivable from lower level data and mechanisms. Yet this
fails to take account of top-down causative processes, and the more general
point that there now appears to be no «privileged» level of causation in the
first place.
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24 TORRANCE, Th. F., Theological Science, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 10.
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One important outcome of this approach is that it offers a luminous as-
sessment of what is often known as «scientism» – the «totalizing attitude that
regards science as the ultimate standard and arbiter of all interesting ques-
tions» 26. Bhaskar’s critical realism allows scientism to be seen as an unjustified
imposition of a single research method appropriate for, and developed in rela-
tion to, one specific level of reality onto every aspect of the natural and social
world 27. For Bhaskar, the nature of the object determines the form of its pos-
sible science; scientism, however, insists that everything must be investigated
using the methods of the natural sciences – even when these are not adapted
or appropriate for the investigation of certain critical questions, such as issues
of meaning or purpose. Scientism denies that there are «any significant diffe-
rences in the methods appropriate to studying social and natural objects» 28.
Scientism thus reduces reality to what can be known through the appli-
cation of one specific research method. Epistemology is allowed to determine
ontology, in that the use of one specific research method determines what is
«seen» – and hence judged to be real. Scientism is, on this approach, blind to
the existence of levels of reality that cannot be engaged by the methods of the
natural sciences – methods, it must be added, which were developed for other
purposes. The observation that a specific research method does not disclose
any given level is misinterpreted as implying that this level does not exist.
This stratified approach to science and religion has the enormous ad-
vantage of doing justice to their complexity and stratification. It recognises
that the natural sciences exist in relationships of interaction and dependency,
and that religion is a multi-layered phenomenon which cannot be reduced to
any of its communal, symbolic, narrative or ideational elements. It is also ca-
pable of accommodating the shifting historical and cultural understandings of
what each of the terms «science» and «religion» designates 29. One of the
more fundamental concerns about Ian Barbour’s four-fold taxonomy of rela-
tionships between science and religion – conflict, dialogue, independence, and
integration – is that it is of severely limited utility in allowing engagement
with historical debates, in that these are socially and culturally embedded, of-
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28 BHASKAR, R., The Possibility of Naturalism, 2.
29 HARRISON, P., The Territories of Science and Religion, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015.
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ten involving the dynamics of institutions (such as the church), cultural asso-
ciations and historical memories rather than the mere relation of ideas 30. A
stratified approach to both science and religion does not displace, but rather
complements, perspectival approaches.
Yet in the end, we are left struggling to discern how such multiple pers-
pectives and levels are to be woven together, in that such a process involves
judgement about what weight is to be attached to each voice, and how see-
ming inconsistencies are to be addressed. Any «transversal» approach to ra-
tionality 31, which, recognizing the Enlightenment’s failure to provide an ade-
quate defence of its own Letztebegründung 32, seeks to be attentive to many
voices and social practices, must make transparent and warranted decisions
about how these voices and practices are to be assessed and integrated. In the
end, the notion of transversality is fundamentally a heuristic device that crea-
tes imaginative space for affirming such multiple approaches, rather than a
conceptual algorithm for calibrating their competing claims to authority, or
the outcomes of their application. Christian theology is one voice in this con-
versation. Yet this is not to suggest that it is drowned out by other voices.
Yet however imprecise we might find the notions of multiple perspecti-
ves and levels, both these approaches nevertheless offer an imaginative frame-
work which allows us to see how multiple approaches might be held together
and correlated, and seen as part of a greater enterprise of securing traction on
a complex reality. Human rationality takes the form of a spectrum of practi-
ces, developed and adapted to a variety of situations and tasks encountered in
the process of production of knowledge. Let me set out, however briefly, some
ideas about the ways in which Christian theology offers us some intellectual
and imaginative resources to engage in creative and constructive dialogue with
other sciences.
In my view, there are three main ways in which Christianity enriches a
broader scientific narrative. First, it provides us with a reassurance of the co-
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herence of reality. No matter how fragmented our world of experience may
seem, there is a half-glimpsed «bigger picture» which holds things together,
its threads connecting together in a web of meaning what might otherwise
seem incoherent and pointless. This theme resonates throughout the poetic
and religious writings of the Middle Ages. As might be expected, it is a major
issue in perhaps that greatest of medieval literary classics – Dante’s Divine Co-
medy. As the poem draws to its close, Dante catches a glimpse of the unity of
the cosmos, in which its multiple aspects and levels are seen to converge into
a single whole 33.
Yet the modern period has seen doubts about the coherence of reality,
many arising from the «new philosophy» of the Scientific Revolution. Do
new scientific ideas destroy any idea of a meaningful reality? The English poet
John Donne (1572-1631) spoke movingly of this concern in the early seven-
teenth century, as scientific discoveries seemed to some to erode any sense of
connectedness and continuity within the world. «Tis all in pieces, all cohe-
rence gone», he wrote of this unsettling new world 34. Where once there was
a sense of intellectual and moral coherence to reality, there now seems to be
what the great German poet and novelist Hermann Hesse (1877-1962) des-
cribed during the brief heyday of the Weimar Republic as a mere aggregation
of «intellectual fashions» and the «transitory values of the day» 35.
Other intellectual developments have also posed a threat to the notion of
a coherent reality, including the philosopher Nancy Cartwright’s idea of a
«dappled world» 36. Where C. S. Lewis argued that «we are not reading ra-
tionality into an irrational universe, but responding to a rationality with which
the universe has always been saturated» 37. Cartwright holds that we are im-
posing an order or rationality when there may be none – or, indeed, there may
be a variety of orderings, requiring multiple accounts of the natural world and
its structures.
Given this reasonable concern about incoherence, it is important to note
that Christian theology provides a web of meaning, an imaginative framework
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which sustains and expresses a deep belief in the fundamental interconnected-
ness of things, which holds Donne’s «pieces» together. Christian theologians
find this theme eloquently expressed in the New Testament, which speaks of
all things «holding together» in Christ (Colossians 1:17) 38. There is a hidden
web of meaning and connectedness behind the ephemeral and incoherent
world that we experience. This was the insight which constantly eluded the
novelist Virginia Woolf (1882-1941), who occasionally experienced short,
stabbing, instances of insight; epiphanic moments which seemed to her to re-
veal «some real thing behind appearances» 39. These transitory and rare «mo-
ments of being» (as she called them) convinced her that there were hidden
webs of meaning and connectedness behind the world she knew. Yet she could
never enter this hidden world; it always seemed to retreat from her as she ap-
proached its door, as if she were grasping at smoke.
Second, Christian theology offers answers to the scientifically unanswe-
rable – to what Karl Popper termed «ultimate questions», such as the mea-
ning of life, and our place in a greater scheme of things. These are to be seen
as supplementations of the rigorous and consistent application of the scienti-
fic method, protecting us against the existential vacuum that results from
seeing science alone as the foundation of meaning and value. Christian theo-
logy thus provides a framework of meaning, both imaginative and cognitive,
which both helps us to grasp the contours of reality more firmly, but inspires
us to want to pursue the good and the beautiful.
The author Salman Rushdie is severely – and rightly – critical of «any
ideology that claims to have a complete, totalized explanation of the world» 40.
Both science and religion can easily become ideologies – above all, when they
assert that they alone have a monopoly of truth. That’s the error of both reli-
gious fundamentalism and scientism. But it’s an avoidable error. I have argued
for using multiple maps to do justice to the many levels of physical and social
reality, not simply because reality itself is so complex that it demands this form
of representation, but also to challenge any pretensions of ultimacy on the
part of any one science. That’s why I think we need to listen to the American
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sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson. Though no friend of religion, Wilson was
clear that its insights needed to be incorporated into any systemic account of
our world. He argues for the need for consilience – the ability to weave toge-
ther multiple threads of knowledge in a synthesis which is able to disclose a
more satisfying and empowering view of reality 41.
We are drowning in information, while starving for wisdom. The
world henceforth will be run by synthesizers, people able to put together
the right information at the right time, think critically about it, and make
important choices wisely.
And third, Christian theology is able to enrich a scientific narrative by
preventing it from collapsing into a technocratic «dull catalogue of common
things» (John Keats). The sociologist Max Weber used the term «disenchant-
ment» to refer to an excessively intellectual and rationalising way of looking
at nature which limited it to what could be measured and quantified 42. A reli-
gious perspective does not in any way deny the scientific utility of such a ra-
tionalizing approach. It simply insists that there is more that needs to be said,
if a full and satisfying account of reality is to be provided, and offers a supple-
mentation of a scientific narrative by which this might be achieved.
Christian theology thus offers a conceptual map, which affirms the im-
portance of the empirical world, while emphasising the importance of discer-
ning deeper truths and values which cannot be disclosed through the natural
or social sciences. Each individual may thus weave together their personal un-
derstanding of how a scientific narrative may be enriched and supplemented
by its theological counterpart. As Lewis suggests, this allows us to respect the
priviledge of individuality, without becoming trapped by its limitations. Lewis
himself recognized the importance of communal reflection, which allows the
individual to be challenged and enhanced by the insights of others, both living
and dead.
I began this paper by quoting a Spanish philosopher; I shall end by quo-
ting a Spanish-speaking novelist. In one of his short stories, the Argentinian
writer Jorge Luis Borges (1889-1986) tells of a moment when a degree of cla-
rity is unexpectedly brought to what otherwise seemed to be a rather unpro-
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mising conversation. It seemed as if a «more complex interlocutor» had joi-
ned the dialogue, and moved it on 43.
Fue como si hubiera terciado en el diálogo un interlocutor más
complejo.
In this paper, I have argued the need for a more complex narrative than
that offered by the natural sciences alone – or, indeed, by any science on its
own. We need multiple windows on our complex world if we are to apprecia-
te it to the full, and act rightly and meaningfully within it. Now there is no-
thing wrong with seeing only part of the truth, so long as we realize that this
is an incomplete vision. The problems begin if someone thinks that reality is
limited to what one tradition of investigation can disclose.
Reality is just too rich to be exhaustively, or even representatively, des-
cribed by one tradition of investigation, one angle of approach, or one level of
description. There are so many facets of existence that need to be explored, so
many levels of reality to be engaged. We need a dialogue of the sciences – in-
cluding theology! – which attempts to weave together the great human lon-
ging for meaning, and our desire to make sense of our world. This paper may
have explored this notion a little tentatively and inconclusively, but I hope my
readers will feel that there are some interesting possibilities here for further
exploration and discussion.
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